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ADVERSE POSSESSION AGAINST THE STATES:
THE HORNBOOKS HAVE IT WRONG
Paula R. Latovick*
The hornbook rule is that adverse possession statutes do not run against
land owned by state governments. Yet, in practice, the land of many states
is subject to loss by adverse possession. Few states have statutes that
simply and explicitly protect all state land from adverse possession. This
Article describes the variety of ways in which states protect or fail to
protect their land from adverse possession. It concludes with the recom-
mendation that, given increasing development pressures and limited state
enforcement budgets, state legislatures should protect completely all state
land from adverse possession.
INTRODUCTION
Hornbooks generally assert that statutes delimiting acquisi-
tion of title by adverse possession do not run against the United
States or state governments.' While this statement is correct
generally as applied to the United States,2 it often constitutes
an inaccurate and misleading description of the law of several
states.
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas M. Cooley Law School. B.A. 1976, Michigan
State University; J.D. 1980, University of Michigan Law School.
1. - See JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
335 (3d ed. 1989); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7 (2d ed. 1993).
The same general rule appears in property law casebooks. See JOHN E. CRIBBET ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY 1348 (7th ed. 1996); CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE
LIEBMAN, PROPERTY AND LAw 117 (2d ed. 1985); EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA R. KwALL,
FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAw 769 (3d ed. 1992); JOSEPH W. SINGER,
PROPERTY LAw § 1.5.3.3(h) (1993).
2. See 48 U.S.C. § 1489 (1994) (prohibiting adverse possession or prescription of
United States land; allowing title to United States land only by conveyance). The United
States, however, has waived its immunity from adverse possession in a few limited
instances. See, e.g., Conveyances to Occupants of Unpatented Mining Claims, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 701-709 (1994) (permitting the Secretary of Interior to convey up to five acres of an
unpatented mining claim to an occupant who has used the land as a principal place of
residence for not less than seven years prior to July 23, 1962, upon payment of not less
than five dollars per acre); Lands Held Under Color of Title Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1068 (1994)
(permitting the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent to public lands for up to 160
acres, upon payment of not less than $1.25 per acre, to a claimant who establishes that
he has held the tract "in good faith and in peaceful, adverse, possession ... under claim
or color of title for more than twenty years, and that valuable improvements have been
placed on such land or some part thereof has been reduced to cultivation").
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This Article shows that the laws of many states in fact do
permit private parties to acquire state land. by way of adverse
possession and describes the different legal approaches taken.
Part I introduces the doctrine of adverse possession in general,
and in particular against state-owned land, explaining the doc-
trine's theoretical underpinnings. Part II describes the current
law of adverse possession in many states. Part III discusses
those states that have changed their law of adverse possession
during the last twenty years. The Article concludes with the
recommendation that those states that permit adverse posses-
sion of state land should reconsider this permission in light of
modern land use constraints and needs. Current needs dictate
protection of such land today, irrespective of whatever justifica-
tions may have existed previously for the availability of adverse
possession against the state.
I. CLASSIC ADVERSE POSSESSION DOCTRINE
The doctrine of adverse possession provides that an owner of
land may lose his land if he fails to eject trespassers promptly.
If the trespasser uses the land as her own for the length of time
specified in the state's statute of limitations and satisfies com-
mon law and statutory requirements, the owner cannot recover
possession.3 While most statutes speak only in terms of prevent-
ing a lawsuit by the original owner to recover possession,4 the
passing of the statutory time period effectively creates a new
title in the adverse possessor.5
Common law typically requires that possession not only be
continuous for the period of the statute of limitations, but also
be actual, open, continuous, notorious, exclusive, and under color
or claim of right.6 A number of state statutes also require that
the adverse possessor have paid all state and local property
3. See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (Michie 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-41-101(1)
(1982).
4. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A.14-8 (West 1987).
5. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.070 (West 1992); Devins v. Borough of
Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 201 (N.J. 1991).
6. See, e.g., Mackinac Island Dev. Co., Ltd. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 349
N.W.2d 191, 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (quotation omitted).
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taxes assessed during the period of possession.7 Still others
require that the land be "protected by a substantial inclosure"
or "cultivated or improved" in the usual way.8
This rather surprising doctrine, 9 which permits someone to
take title away from the lawful owner of land simply by using
the land openly for a sufficient period of time, is often justified
by reference to one or more of three explanations. The first
suggests that the owner who fails to assert her ownership within
the statute of limitations deserves to lose her property because
she has slept on her rights.'" Under this theory, the law's
transferring title to the adverse possessor is no different than
the law's barring a claim for malpractice or for breach of con-
tract after the statute of limitations has run. As Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes wrote, "Sometimes it is said that, if a man
neglects to enforce his rights, he cannot complain if, after a
while, the law follows his example.""
The unarticulated premise behind this justification is that if
the true owner had made productive use of her land herself, the
land would not have been available for the adverse possessor to
use. The law at once punishes the owner directly for failing to
protect her rights and sanctions her indirectly for not making
economic or productive use of her land.
A second and related justification is that the adverse possessor
has earned title to the land by working it and putting it to use
during the period of the statute of limitations. Justice Holmes
7. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.02 (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-411
(1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.150 (Michie 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-12 (1992);
see also IDAHO CODE § 5-210 (1990) (dealing only with "a person claiming title not founded
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree").
8. N.Y REAL PRoP. AcTS. LAw §§ 512,522 (McKinney 1979); see also NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 11.100 (Michie 1986).
9. Cf John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 816, 872-73 & n.279 (1994) (noting that most land owners have an
"absolutist vision that property rights are free from third party interference").
10. Professor Powell explains that adverse possession:
rests upon social judgments that there should be a restricted duration for the
assertion of"aging claims," and that the elapse of a reasonable time should assure
security to a person claiming to be an owner. The theory upon which adverse
possession rests .is that the adverse possessor may acquire title at such time as
an action in ejectment by the record owner would be barred by the statute of
limitations.
7 RICHARD R. PowELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 1 1012[21 [a] (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1996)
(citation omitted).
11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,476 (1897).
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eloquently expressed the reasoning behind this justification
when he commented that the connection between property and
adverse possession
is further back than the first recorded history. It is in the
nature of man's mind. A thing which you have enjoyed and
used as your own for a long time, whether property or an
opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away
without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself,
however you came by it. The law can ask no better justifica-
tion than the deepest instincts of man.'2
Again, our society's traditional preference for the development
of land appears. If the adverse possessor makes valuable use of
land where the true owner does not, the law views the adverse
possessor as more socially responsible and thus preferable to the
true owner.
13
Holmes' eloquence notwithstanding, others have argued that
the best reason for adverse possession is to provide certainty in
title. 
14
The policy of statutes of limitation is something not always
clearly appreciated. Dean Ames, in contrasting prescription
in the civil law with adverse possession in our law, remarks:
"English lawyers regard not the merit of the possessor, but
the demerit of the one out of possession." It has been sug-
gested, on the other hand, that the policy is to reward those
using the land in a way beneficial to the community. This
12. Id. at 477.
13. One commentator has observed:
The idea of preserving land resources intact for future use has never gained much
popular acceptance. To be sure, many conservationists stress the need for saving
certain resources for future use; and some have probably overemphasized this
point. But most people react negatively to a policy of nonuse. They favor the
maintenance and saving of land resources, but only to the extent to which con-
servation policies can be made consistent with a program of effective current use.
RALEIGH BAmRLOwf LAND REsOURcE ECONOMICs TiE POLmCAL EcONOMY OF RuRAL AND URBAN
LAND RESOURCE USE 284 (1958); see also Stephen S. Visher, The Public Domain, in
CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 15,19 (Guy-Harold Smith ed., 3d ed. 1965) ("Wild
land was long considered to have little value .... Similarly, trees were long inadequate-
ly appreciated. The man who cleared the most land was the popular hero, and he who
did not completely clear his land was called lazy.").
14. See PAUL E. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 54 (2d ed. 1970) (noting that adverse
possession's "great purpose" is "to quiet titles").
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takes too much account of the individual case. The statute
has not for its object to reward the diligent trespasser for his
wrong nor yet to penalize the negligent and dormant owner
for sleeping upon his rights; the great purpose is automatical-
ly to quiet all titles which are openly and consistently assert-
ed, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct errors
in conveyancing.1
5
This third justification, then, focuses more on the burdens that
old claims and proof problems place on real estate and litigation
systems than on the particular equities between the original
owner and the adverse possessor.16
Although these justifications may support the application of
adverse possession against a private landowner, 7 they do not
appear universally convincing when applied to public property
held by governmental entities. Stark differences exist between
private and public ownership. Federal and state governments
own far more land than any single private landowner. 8 Unlike
15. Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135
(1918) (quoting JAMES B. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 197 (1913)) (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted). Justice Holmes rejected this justification for adverse possession
saying:
The end of [statutes of limitations] is obvious, but what is the justification for
depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the
lapse of time? Sometimes the loss of evidence is referred to, but that is a secondary
matter. Sometimes the desirability of peace, but why is peace more desirable after
twenty years than before? It is increasingly likely to come without the aid of
legislation.
Holmes, supra note 11, at 476.
16. But see R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U.
L.Q. 331 (1983), in which Professor Helmholz concludes that most courts take into
account the good faith of the adverse possessor. In other words, courts are more likely
to reward a person who honestly but mistakenly thinks he has been occupying his own
land than one who admits that he has been trespassing knowingly for the duration of
the statute of limitations.
17. Scholars have offered other justifications for adverse possession. See Jeffry M.
Netter et al., An Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes, 6 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 217,220 (1986) (arguing that adverse possession is primarily a device that reduces
the risk associated with land title transfer); Sprankling, supra note 9, at 816 (arguing
that adverse possession law is better explained by prodevelopment bias rather than by
the "constructive notice fiction").
18. The US. government owns roughly 730 million acres of land, just less than one-
third of all the surface land in the United States. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, 15th
ANN. REP. 249 (1984). A dramatic example of a state with high government ownership
of land is Hawaii. As of the mid-1960s, the Hawaii Legislature calculated that the state
and federal governments owned almost 49% of the land in Hawaii. See Hawaii Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984).
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private owners of land, the federal and state governments are
comprised of many different departments with varying responsi-
bilities and functions. Perhaps in recognition of the adminis-
trative difficulties, the federal government consistently has
maintained its immunity from adverse possession.19 After all,
the public (for whom the government holds the land) should not
suffer from the negligence or inattention of government agents.2 °
The states have not taken such a uniform approach.2'
Concerns of more recent vintage augment the traditional
reasons for preventing adverse possession of state land. Although
state legislatures have tried adopting measures to protect deli-
cate environmental areas from private development,22 the United
States Supreme Court has reduced their ability to do so. 23 Given
the difficulty of protecting open land in private hands, it is all
the more important not to encourage development of the open
land that the states themselves own. Permitting private interests
to acquire title to state land by developing it sends the wrong
message. Private developers may well take the chance that the
19. See supra note 2. Historically, the common law presumed "that the king was
too busy looking after the welfare of his subjects to sue." Developments in the Law-
Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1251 (1950).
20. See, e.g., State v. Owen, 41 A.2d 809, 812 (N.J. 1945).
21. See infra Part II. In practice, it sometimes has proven difficult for the appro-
priate departments of state governments to keep track not only of what state-owned land
is being encroached upon, but occasionally even which land is owned by the state. See,
e.g., Mackinac Island Dev. Co. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 349 N.W.2d 191, 196
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a private claimant had adversely possessed state
land where the state park commission had not ousted the claimant from the land for
more than 22 years, during which time the State Attorney General had negotiated with
the claimant to purchase an aviation easement over the land, never realizing that the
state owned an interest in the land); Hickey v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 220 N.E.2d 415,
427 (Ill. 1966) (holding that Illinois was estopped from asserting its legal title in land
along Chicago's waterfront because over the course of 50 years, the Illinois Attorney
General had disclaimed any state interest in the land and the Illinois Commerce Com-
mission repeatedly had approved sales by the privately owned Illinois Central Railroad
of parts of the lands).
22. See, e.g., MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 324.35302(a) (West Supp. 1996) (protecting
"critical [sand] dune areas" as "unique, irreplaceable, and fragile resource [s] that provide
significant recreational, economic, scientific, geological, scenic, botanical, educational,
agricultural, and ecological benefits to the people of this state and to people from other
states and countries who visit"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1995)
(protecting life, property, and the habitat of numerous plant and animal species, several
of which were threatened or endangered).
23. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2318-19 (1994) (holding that
a development permit condition must have a nexus to a legitimate state interest, bearing
a "rough proportionality' to the expected impact of the proposed development); Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that if govern-
ment regulations governing land development reduce land values to zero, this action
constitutes a taking unless common law could have prohibited proposed development).
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state will not discover in timely fashion their trespass, hoping
thereby to acquire title.24 Further, it is likely that in times of
economic downsizing, states are likely to spend less of their lim-
ited resources on monitoring state land and ejecting trespassers.
It is appropriate that those states where adverse possession
is available against state-owned land consider changing their
law to protect diminishing resources better.
II. THE VARIOUS STATE APPROACHES
As noted above, a number of hornbooks and other authorities
make the mistake of suggesting simply that the states are not
subject at all to adverse possession.25 Others are closer to the
mark in saying that state lands are not subject to adverse pos-
session unless the state has agreed expressly to waive its
immunity.26 Even these authorities mislead, however, by imply-
ing that few states have made themselves subject to adverse
possession statutes of limitations.
While a majority of states follow the hornbook rule, a survey
of state law reveals that a sizeable number of states have
waived to a greater or lesser degree their traditional immunity.
In most cases, this was done without any real explanation as to
why the citizens of the state should lose their public lands
because of the laxity, mistake, or dishonesty of public servants.2"
24. Mackinac Island Dev. Co., 349 N.W.2d at 193-94 (noting that private claimant
discovered state's recorded title to property, but attorney advised claimant not to inform
state of title).
25. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
26. See, eg., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 56 (1984); SHELDON KURTZ & HERBERT
HOVENCAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAw 179 (2d ed. 1993).
27. Many of these states have statutes that expressly exempt state land from
adverse possession. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text. In states where the
statutes are silent on the subject, the courts have generally followed the common law
rule nullum tempus occurrit regi (time does not run against the sovereign) or more demo-
cratically nullum tempus occurrit republicae (time does not run against the state). In
many of these states, the courts have relied on the common law rule of immunity to
protect the state from adverse possession. See, e.g., Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v.
Lindsey, 730 S.W.2d 474, 478-79 (Ark. 1987); Matto v. Dan Beard, Inc., 546 A.2d 854,
863 (Conn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 550 A.2d 1082 (Conn. 1988); Columbus Corp. v.
Cuyahoga County, 589 N.E.2d 467, 470-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Hall v. Nascimento,
594 A.2d 874, 877-78 (R.I. 1991).
28. In Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1991), the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in reversing a lower court's holding that adverse possession could not
run against a municipality, noted several reasons for allowing adverse possession of
SUMMER 1996] 945
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A number of states do not permit adverse possession of state-
owned land held in a governmental capacity or for a specific
public use, but do allow adverse possession of land held by the
government-owned land: (1) "Statutes of limitation allow repose and avoid adjudications
based on stale evidence." (2) "[Aldverse possession promotes certainty of title."
(3) Adverse possession "protects the possessor's reasonable expectations." (4) "[Aldverse
possession promotes active and efficient use of land." (5) Adverse possession "tends to
serve the public interest by stimulating the expeditious assertion of public claims."
(6) Court decisions have ended New Jersey's historic sovereign immunity from suit in
tort and contract claims. (7) At least seven other states permit adverse possession of
state land. (8) Enforcing adverse possession against municipalities would not impose
an "undue burden on municipalities." (9) The court was "reluctant to adopt a policy that
would encourage municipalities not to use, dedicate, or even identify their property."
Id. at 202-04 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). The plaintiffs/claimants in Devins
offered yet another reason: adverse possession "would encourage municipal efficiency
and the return of property to the tax rolls." Id. at 202.
When examined closely, however, none of these reasons proves particularly compel-
ling. The first five reasons, relating to certainty of title and barring stale claims, have
always been asserted in favor of adverse possession in the private sector but have never
been enough to overcome the historic protection of state-owned land. It is not clear why
they should assume greater significance now.
Second, the fact that some or even many states have permitted themselves to be sued
for claims sounding in tort and contract for the wrongful acts of their agents does not
support the notion that the state should lose its land due to oversight, mistake, or fraud.
Holding the state accountable for its agents' wrongful acts where innocent third parties
have been injured is one thing. Giving away public land because the state failed to oust
a persistent trespasser is another thing completely.
Likewise, the Devins court's suggestion that it is appropriate to eliminate the state's
immunity from adverse possession because other states have done so is undermined by
the fact that at least two of the states cited, Michigan and North Carolina, have moved
recently to give greater protection to state-owned land. See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN.
§ 600.5821 (West 1987 and Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (Supp. 1995).
Concomitantly, while the Devins court suggested that it is not a great burden to
expect cities to protect their land through ejectment actions, this is not true of the
states, whose territories are larger and harder to monitor. A mayor of a small town may
personally know every city-owned lot and may notice when someone encroaches upon
one of them. It is not reasonable to make a similar assumption about a governor, state
department director, or even a state county land agent.
The Devins court also seemed oblivious to the differing environmental and conserva-
tion concerns which many states face today. In saying that it was reluctant to adopt a
policy that would encourage a city not to use its land, the court gave voice to the unar-
ticulated premise noted earlier-that is, that we prefer development to non-development
of land. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. In light of the growing environ-
mental pressures to avoid development, see infra Part III, the court's stance not only
appears irresponsible but also infringes on the legislative province.
Finally, one can hardly agree with the plaintiff in Devins that somehow the public
wins when government land is transferred into private hands for no consideration. If
enlarging the tax rolls is seen as necessary in any given city or state, presumably the
governing body can choose to sell off some public land for full market value, thus en-
hancing public funds through both the sales price and the taxes. Simply transferring
land to the tax rolls, without a formal sale, ignores the loss to the government of the
value of the land itself.
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state in a proprietary capacity.2 9 Other states have expressly re-
fused to recognize these distinctions.3 °
Strikingly, even though some states have statutes that
generally seem to subject state land to adverse possession, state
courts have refused to apply the laws as written, instead cre-
ating their own modifications of the legislative pronounce-
ments.3' Finally, in a number of states the courts, perhaps
following the oversimplified hornbook rule, have failed or
refused to follow state laws expressly permitting adverse pos-
session of state land.32 What follows in this Part, then, is a
description of the various ways in which states protect or fail to
protect their lands.
A. Statutes Providing That State Land Is Treated
Like Private Property for Purposes
of Adverse Possession
A number of state legislatures have stated that public lands
are subject to adverse possession under essentially the same
circumstances as private landowners. For example, Kentucky
state law provides: "The limitations prescribed in this chapter
shall apply to actions brought by or in the name of the Com-
monwealth the same as to actions by private persons, except
where a different time is prescribed by statute."33 West Virginia
29. See infra Part II.C.2.
30. See infra Part II.C.2.
31. See infra Parts II.D, II.E.
32. See infra Part II.E.
33. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.150 (Michie 1992). This has been the law in Kentucky
since 1851. See Kentucky Coal & Timber Dev. Co. v. Kentucky Union Co., 214 F. 590,
627 (E.D. Ky. 1914). Despite the clarity of the statute, Kentucky courts have not always
agreed that adverse possession runs against the Commonwealth. In several early cases,
the courts said that the language quoted above meant exactly what it said, i.e., that
state land can be adversely possessed. See Whitley County Land Co. v. Powers' Heirs,
144 S.W. 2, 5 (Ky. 1912); Richie v. Owsley, 121 S.W. 1015, 1017 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909),
modified, Richie v. Owsley, 135 S.W. 439 (Ky. 1911). In contrast, two later cases
suggested that the Commonwealth cannot lose land by adverse possession. See
Commonwealth Dep't of Parks v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711,712 (Ky. 1966); Ford Motor
Co. v. Potter, 330 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Ky. 1959). The most recent case to discuss the issue,
however, stated that "it seems clear that adverse possession may be the basis of
acquiring title even against the Commonwealth in appropriate circumstances." Meade
v. Sturgill, 467 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Ky. 1971). Presumably, "appropriate circumstances"
would exist when all statutory and common law requirements for adverse possession
have been met. This phenomenon of a court misinterpreting or ignoring a statute that
expressly allows adverse possession of state land is not limited to Kentucky. See infra
Part II.E.
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uses a similar catch-all provision to subject the state to all
general statutes of limitations. 4
While Tennessee's Code provides that the statutes of limita-
tions "do not apply to actions brought by the state of Tennessee,
unless otherwise expressly provided,"35 Tennessee's legislation
does permit adverse possession of state land in one setting:
where an adverse possessor has held state land under color of
title and the document has been on file with the register's office
for thirty years,3 6 "no person, whether upon disability or not,
nor the state of Tennessee, shall commence or sustain an action
for the recovery of same in any court."37
Oklahoma's statutes do not specifically make state-owned land
subject to adverse possession. The limitations period for general
adverse possession is fifteen years.3' A later chapter entitled
"Property" contains two sections, which, when read together,
suggest that adverse possession is available against the state:
Occupancy for any period confers a title sufficient against
all except the state, and those who have title by prescription,
accession, transfer, will or succession.39
Occupancy for the period prescribed by civil procedure, or
any law of this state as sufficient to bar an action for the
recovery of the property, confers a title thereto, denominated
a title by prescription, which is sufficient against all.4"
Thus, occupancy without title for a period less than the statute
of limitations will give the occupier rights against everyone but
the state and those who actually have title. Occupancy for the
duration of the statute of limitations, however, confers title
34. See W. VA. CODE § 55-2-19 (1994) ("Every statute of limitation, unless otherwise
expressly provided, shall apply to the State."). Despite the apparently unlimited nature
of this language, however, the courts of West Virginia read this statute early on to
permit adverse possession only of state land not "used in the administration of
government." State v. Harman, 50 S.E. 828, 837 (W. Va. 1905). Thus, West Virginia
state-owned land used "for purely governmental purposes" is not subject to adverse
possession, but other state-owned land is. Foley v. Doddridge County Ct., 46 S.E. 246,
251 (W. Va. 1903). For a discussion of West Virginia and other states that distinguish
between governmental and proprietary uses, see infra Part II.C.2.
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-113 (1980).
36. See id. § 28-2-105.
37. Id. § 28-2-106.
38. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 93 (West 1988).
39. Id. tit. 60, § 332 (West 1994) (emphasis added).
40. Id. § 333 (emphasis added).
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"sufficient against all," with no exception for the state. This
seems to indicate that adverse possession for the statutory per-
iod is sufficient to obtain title even as to state-owned land.
As discussed more fully in Part III, Florida has moved away
from protection of state land from adverse possession. Although
a 1974 statute provided generally that "[a] civil action or pro-
ceeding ... including one brought by the state ... shall be
barred unless begun within the time prescribed in this chap-
ter,"4' a 1978 amendment exempted actions on behalf of the
state for "unauthorized use or invasion of state-owned lands,
including sovereignty lands,"42 thus preventing adverse posses-
sion of state-owned land. This exemption, however, expired by
its own terms on July 1, 1983. The Florida legislature reenacted
other portions of the exempting section, but it did not extend the
state's immunity from adverse possession at that time.43 As a
result, Florida state-owned land, including sovereignty land, now
appears to be subject to adverse possession on the same terms
as privately owned land, although no cases have been decided
since these legislative changes.
The Florida courts have allowed state land to be taken
through means other than adverse possession. For example, in
1981 (before the expiration of the exemption of state land from
adverse possession) the Florida Supreme Court held that the
state could lose its title to so-called "section sixteen lands"44
(those designated for school purposes when the state was admit-
ted to the Union) under the state's Marketable Record Title
Act.45 Furthermore, in a number of Florida cases, the courts held
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 95.011 (Harrison 1996) (emphasis added).
42. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-289. The Florida Constitution defines "sovereignty lands"
as "lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state, which have not
been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines." FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 11.
The state holds title to such lands "by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the
people." Id.
43. See 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-105 (effective June 17, 1990).
44. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
45. See Askew v. Sonson, 409 So. 2d 7, 15 (Fla. 1981). Marketable record title acts
are designed to simplify title searches (and thereby simplify land title transactions) by
cutting off interests and claims that are so old that recent records make no reference
to the claims. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 1, § 11.12. Florida's current Marketable
Record Title Act (MRTA) can be found at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 712 (West 1989 & Supp.
1996).
In Askew, an interloper's deed of state lands had been recorded in the county offices.
More than 30 years later, the owner brought suit to quiet title in himself and to
extinguish any state claim based on the MRTA. Askew, 409 So. 2d at 7. The court held
that the State had subjected itself to the MRTA and had lost title to the property upon
the passage of 30 years, even though unlike a private person, the State had no way of
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that although the claimant had not established adverse posses-
sion against the state, the state could still be estopped from
reclaiming the land, based on the actions of its officers and
agents.46
Wisconsin, too, moved to increase the state's exposure to
adverse possession. In 1979, the Wisconsin legislature cut the
time period for adverse possession of state land in half, so that
the time period is now twenty years, the same as that required
of adverse possessors of private land.47
Despite subjecting state land to adverse possession generally,
however, the Wisconsin legislature has exempted certain classi-
fications of state land from adverse possession. These include
college, university, and school lands.4' The legislature expressly
left all other state, city, village, town, county, school district,
sewerage district, and other governmental lands subject to the
twenty-year statute of limitations for adverse possession.49
Despite the moves of Florida and Wisconsin to increase their
exposure to adverse possession, other states have moved in the
other direction-toward greater protection of state-owned land.
These recent developments are discussed below in Part III.
knowing that a void deed had been given on its land. See id. at 15. The State, not subject
to local taxes, would not have been put on notice of an adverse claim as a private citizen
would be when she did not receive her annual tax bills. See id. at 13. It does not appear
that the issue of adverse possession, or the State's immunity from it under the 1978
statutory amendment, was raised to the court. The treatment of section 16 lands is dis-
cussed fully infra, Part II.C.1.
46. See, e.g., Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Bass, 67 So. 2d 433, 433-34
(Fla. 1953); see also infra Part II.D.
47. See 1979 Wis. Laws 323 (effective July 1, 1980); WIS. STAT. § 893.29(1) (1991-92).
Despite this parity with general adverse possession, however, separate sections providing
a shorter statute of limitations for adverse possession under a good faith claim of title
or with payment of taxes do not apply against the state. See id. §§ 893.26-893.27.
48. See Wis. STAT., § 893.29(2) (1991-92). School lands receive special protection in
many states. See infra Part III.C.1.
49. See id. § 893.29(1). In Department of Transp. v. Black Angus Steak House, Inc.,
330 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), the court declined to extend protection against
adverse possession to state highway property. The Wisconsin legislature, in response,
amended section 893.29(2) to protect from adverse possession "property held by the state
• for highway purposes, including but not limited to widening, alteration, relocation,
improvement, reconstruction and construction." See 1983 Wis. Laws 189; WIS. STAT.
§ 893.29(2)(c) (1991-92).
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B. Longer Statutes of Limitations Apply to the State
Than to Private Land Owners
A number of state statutes allow state land to be taken by
adverse possession, but provide a much longer time period for
the state to bring actions for recovery of land than is given to
private owners. For example, in almost identical statutes,
North and South Dakota require forty years for adverse posses-
sion of state lands,50 but only twenty years for adverse posses-
sion against a private owner. 51
North Carolina's law provides that, where he has color of title,
an adverse possessor must hold state land for twenty-one years
to obtain title, 2 but may take private land after only seven
years;* and, where there is no color of title, an adverse possess-
or must hold state land thirty years54 but may take private land
after twenty years.55
California and Montana have ten-year statutes for adverse
possession of state-owned land56 and five-year statutes for
privately owned land.57 Both California and Montana statutes
provide, however, that land dedicated to public use may not be
taken by adverse possession, no matter how long the occupancy
continues.58
50. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-01 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-3-4 (Michie
1984). As discussed in Part II.C.1, infra, North Dakota does exempt so-called original
grant lands or school lands from adverse possession. Surprisingly, South Dakota's ex-
press permission of adverse possession appears to be in direct conflict with its state
constitution, which provides that "No claim to any public lands by any trespasser
thereon by reason of occupancy, cultivation or improvement thereof, shall ever be
recognized. .. ." S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
51. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-04 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-3-1 (Michie
1984).
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-35(2) (1983). A separate section provides: "Title to real
property held by the State and subject to public trust rights may not be acquired by
adverse possession. . . ." Id. § 1-45.1 (Supp. 1995).
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-38 (1983).
54. See id. § 1-35(1).
55. See id. § 1-39.
56. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 315 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-302 (1995).
57. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 318-319 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-401
(1995).
58. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1007 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-301 (1995). See
infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
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Idaho's statute provides a ten-year statute of limitations for
actions for the recovery of state-owned land,59 compared with a
five-year statute for privately owned land. ° The statutory lang-
uage would seem to apply to all state-owned land. Yet, the Idaho
Supreme Court has created two exceptions: (1) Land "reserved
for, or dedicated to some public use" cannot be adversely pos-
sessed;6 ' and (2) "Title to school grant lands cannot be acquired
as against the state no matter how long they have been adverse-
ly occupied." 2
Thus, while these state legislatures have been willing to per-
mit adverse possession of state-owned land, they have also
recognized that the state is not in the same position as a private
landowner vis-A-vis its land, and should have a longer period of
time in which to protect its rights.6 3
C. The Use to Which State Land Is Put
May Affect Adverse Possession
1. The Majority of States Hold Immune from Adverse Pos-
session Land Dedicated to School Use-When many western and
mid-western states were admitted to the Union, the U.S. govern-
ment granted the new admittees designated lands specifically
for the support of public education and of schools.64 The terms
59. See IDAHO CODE § 5-202 (1990).
60. See id. § 5-203.
61. Hellerud v. Hauck, 13 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Idaho 1932); see also Rutledge v. State,
482 P.2d 515,517 (Idaho 1971) (holding that where a navigable river had changed course
exposing the river bed, the state could not claim that the land was held for a public
purpose as the river was no longer running over it for the benefit of the public).
62. Helerud, 13 P.2d at 1101.
63. Some states, however, have maintained the same statute of limitations as that
for privately owned land. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.150 (Michie 1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 28-2-101 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-2 (1992); W. VA. CODE § 55-2-19
(1994); see also supra, Part II.A.
64. See Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 24, 36 Stat. 557, 572-73 (1910); Act
Supplementary to the Act ofAdmission of Arkansas, ch. CXX, 5 Stat. 58 (1836); Colorado
Enabling Act, ch. 139, § 7, Pt. 3, 18 Stat. 474, 475 (1875); Idaho Admission Act, ch. 656,
§§ 4-5, 26 Stat. 215, 215-16 (1890); Illinois Enabling Act, ch. LXVII, § 6, 3 Stat. 428,
430 (1818); Indiana Enabling Act, ch. 57, § 6, 3 Stat. 289, 290 (1816); Act Supplemental
to the Act for Admission of Iowa and Florida into the Union, ch. LXXV, § 6, 5 Stat. 789,
789 (1845); Act Providing for the Admission of Michigan into the Union, ch. CXXI, 5
Stat. 59 (1836); Minnesota Enabling Act, ch. LX, § 5, 11 Stat. 166, 167 (1857); Act for
Admission of Missouri into the Union, ch. XXII, 3 Stat. 545, 547 (1820); Montana
Enabling Act, ch. 180, §§ 10-11, 25 Stat. 676, 679-80 (1889); Nebraska Enabling Act,
ch. LIX, § 7, 13 U.S. Stat. 47, 49 (1864); Nevada Enabling Act, ch. XXXVI, § 7, 13 Stat.
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of the grants varied from state to state, but the intention re-
mained the same-to provide support for public schools. "5 These
"school lands"66 were not necessarily expected to be used for the
location of schools. Instead, it was contemplated that many of
these lands would be leased or sold; and, the proceeds applied
to support schools.67 Most, but not all, states accepted these
30, 32(1864); New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 6,36 Stat. 557, 561-62(1910); North
Dakota EnablingAct, ch. 180, §§ 10-11,25 Stat. 676,679-80(1889); Oklahoma Enabling
Act, ch. 3335, §§ 7, 9, 34 Stat. 267, 272, 274 (1906); Act for the Admission of Oregon into
the Union, ch. XXXIII, § 4, 11 Stat. 383, 383 (1859); South Dakota EnablingAct, ch. 180,
§§ 10-11, 25 Stat. 676, 679-80 (1889); Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, §§ 6, 10, 28 Stat. 107,
109, 110 (1894); Washington Enabling Act, ch. 180, §§ 10-11, 25 Stat. 676, 679-80
(1889); Wisconsin Enabling Act, ch. LXXXIX, § 7, 9 Stat. 56, 58 (1846).
65. The Utah Supreme Court recently observed:
When the thirteen original colonies formed the United States, each held sovereign
control over the lands within its borders. Those lands provided a tax base for
financing governmental functions, including public education. As the United States
expanded westward, additional states were created on lands that belonged to the
United States as territories. The federal government retained ownership over much
of the land within those states. Because land owned by the federal government was
exempt from taxation by the states, those states had a smaller tax base for
financing public education. To provide a source of revenue for public education,
Congress granted new states federal lands to be used for the support of public
schools. The income from those lands was to be placed in a permanent trust fund
for the support of the public schools.
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 917
(Utah 1993) (footnote omitted).
66. For all the states discussed in this Article, the U.S. government designated at
least section 16 of every township as "school land." The term "section 16 land" has
become synonymous with "school land." See, e.g., infra notes 67, 89, 94, 106 and
accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Act Authorizing Alabama to Sell State School Lands, ch. LIX, 4 Stat.
237 (1827) (permitting Alabama to sell school lands "and to invest the money arising
from the sale thereof, in some productive fund, the proceeds of which shall be forever
applied, under the direction of said legislature, for the use and support of schools within
the several townships ... and for no other use or purpose, whatsoever").
As the land in its wild state was of no benefit to the people of the township, and
as a revenue could only be derived from it by cultivation, the lands were leased
under suitable provisions to preserve them from waste. It was soon, however,
discovered that this process would end in the destruction of the land; every where
the sixteenth section was in a state of ruinous dilapidation. In this condition of
things, application was made to Congress, by the Legislature of this State, for
leave to authorize the sale of the sixteenth section, by the assent of the township,
which was granted-the proceeds of the sale to be invested in some productive
fund.
Long & Long v. Brown, 4 Ala. 622, 629 (1843). See also Act Authorizing Ohio to Sell
State School Lands, ch. VI, 4 Stat. 138 (1826); Act Authorizing Indiana to Sell State
School Lands, ch. XCI, 4 Stat. 298 (1828).
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school lands in perpetual trust for the education of their chil-
dren and adopted constitutional provisions to reflect that trust.68
Often the trust extended to lands acquired by the state for
educational purposes from any source, not just to lands granted
for educational purposes by the U.S. government. 9 Other states,
in addition to recognizing this trust, expressly dictated that such
school lands should be immune from the claims of private
70occupiers.
These constitutional provisions mandate that if the state sells
school lands, the proceeds must be held in trust for public edu-
cation and may not be spent on other matters. 7' The courts
interpreting these provisions often have taken them literally and
have enforced them emphatically. One early Idaho court refused
to take a penalty for a usurious loan out of a school fund, saying
that any statute that allowed "one dollar" to be diverted from
the school fund for any purpose other than support of the
68. See ARiZ. CONST. art. X, §§ 1, 2, 8; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, §§ 3, 4, 8; IND. CONST.
art. 8, §§ 2, 3, 7; IOWA CONST. art. 9, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 8; Mo. CONST. of 1875
art. 11 § 6; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6-9; NEv. CONST. art. XI,
§ 3; N.M. CONST. art. XII, §§ 2,3, 12; N.D. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 9; OKLA. CONST. art. XI,
§§ 1, 2, 4; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 2, 5, 6, 9, 14; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 5; UTAH CONST.
art. XX, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. 10, § 2.
69.. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art, IX, § 5 (including within the public school fund estates
that escheat to the state and all grants, gifts or devises made to the state for educational
purposes); see also IOWA CONST. art. 9, 2nd, § 3 (including in the fund the estates of
people who died without heirs); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 2 (including in the fund lands
given or granted by a person or corporation, interests in estates that escheat to the state,
unclaimed corporation shares and dividends, grants, gifts, devises, or bequests made
to the state for general educational purposes).
70. For example, the Idaho Constitution provides:
No law shall ever be passed by the legislature granting any privileges to persons
who may have settled upon any such public lands [granted to the state by the U.S.
government], subsequent to the survey thereof by the general government, by
which the amount to be derived by the sale, or other disposition of such lands,
shall be diminished, directly or indirectly.
IDAHO CONST. art. IX § 8; see also, COLO. CONST. art. IX § 10; N.D. CONST. art. IX § 9; S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 10.
71. For example, the Idaho Constitution provides:
The public school fund of the state shall forever remain inviolate and intact; the
interest thereon only shall be expended in the maintenance of the schools of the
state .... No part of this fund, principal or interest, shall ever be transferred to
any other fund, or used or appropriated except as herein provided.
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 3. See also IOWA CONST. art. IX, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 11, § 8;
MONT. CONST. art. X, § 3; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 2; N.D. CONST. art. IX, § 2; OKLA. CONST.
art. XI, § 2; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Wis. CONST. art. X, § 2.
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schools was unconstitutional.72 More recently, the Idaho Su-
preme Court has held that income earned from leases and
timber sales on school lands by the State Land Board must be
used for school purposes and could not be paid into a general
fund.73 Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that
school lands are held in trust for educational purposes.74
The Texas courts have refused to allow counties to pay for the
expense of a school land survey with a grant of a portion of such
lands,75 and have said that a county may not convey school lands
in settlement of a claim relating to other matters.76 Similarly,
the United States Supreme Court has held that New Mexico
could not use three percent of the annual income from sales and
leases of school lands to advertise for buyers and lessees of the
lands.7 7 Further, while school lands may be leased and the
rentals applied to education,78 the lands may not be used for
other purposes, even public ones. Thus, school lands cannot be
used to create a state park.7 9
The question of using school lands to achieve some other, non-
school public purpose has arisen several times. In virtually every
case, courts have concluded that, as to school trust lands, "trust
beneficiaries do not include the general public or other govern-
mental institutions, and the trust is not to be administered for
the general welfare of the state."0 The United States Supreme
72. State v. Fitzpatrick, 51 P. 112, 114 (Idaho 1897).
73. See Moon v. State Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 724 P.2d at 125, 125 (Idaho 1986).
74. See Board of Educ. Lands & Funds v. Jarchow, 362 N.W.2d. 19, 26 (Neb. 1985)
(holding that the doctrine of laches cannot be applied against the state in a suit by the
state to protect a public interest such as the school land trust); see also State ex rel.
Bottcher v. Bartling, 31 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Neb. 1948) (refusing to permit the state to
use gains in the school fund to offset previous losses as the state constitution required
the state to preserve the school fund inviolate and undiminished).
75. See San Augustine County v. Madden, 87 S.W. 1056, 1059 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
76. See Colorado County v. Travis County, 176 S.W. 845, 851 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
77. See Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 48 (1919).
78. See Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720,
729 (Utah 1990).
79. See State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807, 814 (Alaska 1981) (holding that
the State had violated trust provision of original federal grant by not compensating the
trust for the value of university land included in a state park). The Alaska Supreme
Court noted that language in the grant of land to the University was nearly identical
to that used to grant school lands to several states. Based on that similarity, the court
held that the University could not permit land granted to it by the United States to be
included in a state park, but instead had to keep it "for the 'exclusive use and benefit'
of the university." Id. at 813.
80. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n. v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,
919 (Utah 1993).
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Court ruled that Arizona could not appropriate school lands for
the construction of a state highway without compensating the
school fund, even though the remaining school lands increased
in value because of the presence of the highway. 8' The Washing-
ton Supreme Court held that legislation to relieve the timber
industry from contracts to harvest timber on school lands, after
the price of timber fell precipitously, violated the state's role as
trustee for the schools.8" This was true despite the threat to the
state's economy posed by the devastating impact of the enforce-
ment of the contracts on the timber industry."
Not surprisingly then, most courts have held that a state
statute of limitations for adverse possession that appears to
apply to school lands violates the state constitution.' In one of
the leading cases on the subject, the Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected a claim-to school land by a trespasser who had been ac-
tively using the land for twenty-five years." In concluding that
adverse possession should not run against school lands,86 the
court cited the Organic Act of Minnesota, 7 the Minnesota
Enabling Act,8 and the Minnesota Constitution by which the
81. See Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 469 (1967),
enforced, State ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep't, 428 P.2d 996 (Ariz. 1967).
82. See County of Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d 576, 582 (Wash. 1984).
83. See id. at 578; Gladden Farms, Inc. v. State, 633 P.2d 325, 330 (Ariz. 1981)
(holding that Arizona could not sell school lands to a state agency for relocation of people
displaced by floods without a public auction). In Gladden Farms, the Arizona Supreme
Court opined:
However worthwhile and desirable this sale may be for the humanitarian
purposes for which it is made, we do not believe that the sale without auction and
bid assures the 'highest and best' price that the Enabling Act requires. The
Enabling Act does not allow trust lands to be used for the purpose of subsidizing
public programs no matter how meritorious the programs.
Id. at 330. See also Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n, Inc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 236-38 (Okla.
1982) (holding that Oklahoma was not permitted to lease school lands for less than
market value for the benefit of farmers and ranchers and that legislation setting ceilings
on lease rates for school lands was invalid).
84. See United States v. Fenton, 27 F. Supp. 816, 819 (D. Idaho 1939); State v.
Peterson, 97 P.2d 603,605 (Idaho 1939); Scofield v. Schaeffer, 116 N.W. 210,211 (Minn.
1908); Newton v. Weiler, 286 P. 133, 136 (Mont. 1930); Propst v. Board of Educ. Lands
& Funds, 55 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Neb. 1952); State v. City of Seattle, 107 P. 827, 831
(Wash. 1910). Of note is Judge Thurman's comprehensive opinion in Van Wagoner v.
Whitmore, 199 P. 670 (Utah 1921).
85. See Murtaugh v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 112 N.W. 860, 862 (Minn. 1907).
86. Id. at 861-62.
87. Ch. CXXI, 9 Stat. 403 (1849).
88. Ch. LX, § 5, 11 Stat. 166 (1857).
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state had accepted the grant of section sixteen and thirty-six
lands for the use of the schools. 89 The court said:
The state accepted the trust, and by its Constitution solemn-
ly covenanted with the United States to apply the granted
lands to the sole use of the schools according to the purpose
of the grant, and prohibited the sale of any portion of the
granted land except at public sale. Such being the nature of
the title of the state to its school lands, it is unthinkable
that the Legislature intended, by [its adverse possession
statute of limitations] to provide a way whereby the trust as
to any of the school lands might be defeated, and title there-
to acquired by adverse possession, contrary to the mandate
of the Constitution that title thereto could only be obtained
by a public sale thereof.
We are, then, of the opinion that, if the statute under
consideration must be construed as authorizing the acquisi-
tion of title to the school lands of the state by adverse pos-
session, it violates in this respect, not only the terms of the
grant, but also the Constitution of the state. 90
The Supreme Courts of Idaho and Washington have also held
that a statute that would subject school lands to adverse posses-
sion would be unconstitutional.9
The North Dakota Supreme Court has held school land im-
mune from adverse possession, relying exclusively on the terms
of the North Dakota Enabling Act.92 The North Dakota courts
have, however, allowed adverse possession to begin to run
89. MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 8.
90. Murtaugh, 112 N.W. at 862.
91. See State v. Peterson, 97 P.2d 603, 605 (Idaho 1939); O'Brien v. Wilson, 97 P.
1115, 1116 (Wash. 1908).
92. See Cook v. Clark, 375 N.W.2d 181, 183 (N.D. 1985) (citing North Dakota
Enabling Act, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676 (1889)). The North Dakota Constitution expressly
makes school lands a perpetual trust fund for the maintenance of the state's public
schools. N.D. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Arizona is another state to adopt expressly the terms
of its EnablingAct. Recently, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that "[in 1911, the
Arizona electorate accepted land grants by ratifying article 10, section 1 of the Arizona
Constitution. Provisions of the Enabling Act then became part of Arizona law." Campana
v. State Land Dep't 860 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Kadish v. State
Land Dep't, 747 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Ariz. 1987)), affd, ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605 (1989)).
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against a private buyer of school lands before issuance of a deed,
holding that the state's interest is not affected so long as the
buyer pays full compensation.93
Not all states, however, were treated in the same manner on
their admission to the Union. For example, while the United
States granted all section sixteen and thirty-six lands to the
State of Oregon "for the use of schools,"94 the grant did not re-
quire that the lands and their proceeds constitute a permanent
school fund for school support only, as the grants to some other
states had.95 In light of this omission, the Oregon courts have
held that school lands are not held in trust. Rather, like all
other state-owned lands, Oregon school lands are subject to
adverse possession under the state's statute of limitations.96 In
reaching the same conclusion, early courts in Indiana and Mis-
souri addressed only state law and made no mention of their
organic and enabling laws.97 The Indiana Enabling Act simply
granted section sixteen lands to the inhabitants of the various
townships "for the use of schools," and made no mention of a
trust.9" The Indiana Constitution does provide that the Common
93. See Cook, 375 N.W.2d at 184. Courts in Arkansas and Utah have reached the
same conclusion. See Hibben v. Malone, 109 S.W. 1008, 1010 (Ark. 1908); Minersville
Land & Livestock Co. v. Staten, 325 P.2d 260, 263-64 (Utah 1958).
94. Act of Feb. 14, 1859, ch. XXXIII, § 4, 11 Stat. 383, 383. The offer of these lands
to the state for schools was expressly accepted by the Oregon legislature. 1859 Or. Laws
Spec. Sess. 29.
95. See, e.g., Oklahoma EnablingAct, ch. 3335, §§ 7,9, 34 Stat. 267, 272, 274 (1906).
See also Idaho Admission Act, ch. 656, §§ 4-5, 26 Stat. 215, 215-16 (1890); Montana,
North Dakota, and South Dakota Enabling Act, ch. 180, §§ 10-11, 25 Stat. 676, 679-80
(1889); Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 10, 28 Stat. 107, 110; Washington Enabling Act,
ch. 180, §§ 10-11, 25 Stat. 676, 679-80 (1889).
96. See Schneider v. Hutchinson, 57 P. 324, 325 (Or. 1899). Unable to argue that
school lands are held in trust, the plaintiff in Schneider argued that the school lands
were granted upon a condition subsequent, and that if the lands were taken by adverse
possession, the United States would have the right to re-enter and take possession. Id.
at 326. The court rejected that argument, holding that the grant to the State of Oregon
had been "an absolute grant, vesting the title in the state for a special purpose. The
language of the act of congress is that such land 'shall be granted to the state for the
use of schools,' and the United States has no right to re-enter for any reason whatever."
Id.
97. See Hargis v. Inhabitants of Congressional Township, 29 Ind. 70 (1867). The
Hargis court did not mention the Indiana Constitution, which expressly provided that
"[tihe principal of the Common School fund shall remain a perpetual fund, which may
be increased, but shall never be diminished." IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. See also School
Dir. of St. Charles v. Goerges, 50 Mo. 194 (1872).
98. Indiana Enabling Act, ch. 57, § 6, 3 Stat. 289, 290 (1816). The Act provided in
pertinent part:
And be it further enacted, That the following propositions be, and the same are
hereby offered to the convention of the said territory of Indiana, when formed, for
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School Fund "shall remain a perpetual fund, which may be
increased, but shall never be diminished,"9 and that "[a]ll trust
funds, held by the State, shall remain inviolate, and be faithful-
ly and exclusively applied to the purposes for which the trust
was created."'100 The Indiana Supreme Court, however, did not
discuss those provisions in opining that school lands were
subject to adverse possession.'0 '
It appears that the federal government also did not require
California to pledge to protect its school lands upon admission
to the Union. The Act for Admission of the State of California
10 2
makes no mention of the public schools or the preservation of
lands for their benefit. Nonetheless, the first California Consti-
tution, adopted in 1849, provided: "the proceeds of all lands that
... may be granted by the United States to this State for the
support of common schools ... shall be and remain a perpetual
fund, the interest of which... shall be inviolably appropriated
to the support of common schools throughout the State."'0 3
Despite this unambiguous language that the school fund would
be "perpetual," and that it was "inviolably appropriated to the
support of common schools," the voters of California repealed this
section of their Constitution in 1964 without replacing it. 0 4 With
this section gone, there would seem to be no argument remaining
that California's school lands are specifically protected from ad-
verse possession under a theory of public trust.'
The federal government offered Michigan all of the section
sixteen lands in the state for school land at the time it was ad-
mitted to the Union. The Michigan Legislature formally accepted
their free acceptance or rejection, which, if accepted by the convention, shall be
obligatory upon the United States.
First. That the section numbered sixteen, in every township, and when such
section has been sold, granted or disposed of, other lands, equivalent thereto, and
most contiguous to the same, shall be granted to the inhabitants of such township
for the use of schools.
Id.
99. IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
100. Id. § 7.
101. See Hargis, 29 Ind. at 72.
102. Ch. L, 9 Stat. 452, 452-53 (1850).
103. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. 9, § 2 (emphasis added).
104. See CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. 9, § 4 (repealed 1964).
105. California's school lands presumably are covered under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007
(West 1982), which protects land dedicated to public use from adverse possession. But
this clearly is not as strong a protection as a constitutionally imposed trust.
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those lands as part of its agreement to be admitted.' °6 The first
Michigan Constitution, adopted in 1835, provided:
The proceeds of all lands that have been or hereafter may
be granted by the United States to this state, for the support
of schools . . . shall be and remain a perpetual fund; the
interest of which ... shall be inviolably appropriated to the
support of schools throughout the state.
10 7
Like California, however, Michigan voters removed this lan-
guage from their constitution in 1963.108 Interestingly, in an
early case involving the sale of school lands by the state, the
United States Supreme Court said:
The State of Michigan was admitted to the Union, with the
unalterable condition "that every section No. 16, in every
township of the public lands, and where such section has
been sold or otherwise disposed of, other lands equivalent
thereto, and as contiguous as may be, shall be granted to the
State for the use of schools."0 9
Currently, the Michigan Constitution does not contain any
reference to the section sixteen school lands or their proceeds.
Following the 1963 constitutional amendment, school lands, like
all other state land, probably were subject to adverse possession.
The state amended its statute of limitations in 1988 to provide
that state land is no longer subject to adverse possession,"0 but
significantly, that does not specifically mention school lands held
by local municipal governments."'
Alabama has an interesting history on this topic. At the time
Alabama was admitted to the Union, the United States did not
grant section sixteen school lands to the State of Alabama, but
106. See Ordinance of July 25, 1836, § 1, 1857 MICH. COMP. LAws 37,38 (assent given
through Act of Dec. 15, 1836, 1857 MICH. COMP. LAWS 42).
107. MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. X, § 2 (emphasis added).
108. See MICH. CONST. art. VIII.
109. Cooper v. Roberts, 59 US. (18 How.) 173, 179 (1856) (emphasis added)
(quotation omitted).
110. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5821 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
111. See id. The Michigan courts have long permitted adverse possession of
municipally owned land. In a series of early cases, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that adverse possession was available against land located within municipal streets, see,
e.g., Leonard v. City of Detroit, 66 N.W. 488, 489 (Mich. 1896), and land held pursuant
to non-payment of taxes, see, e.g., Klatt v. City of Detroit, 127 N.W. 409, 411 (Mich.
1910). No case appears to have involved school lands.
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rather to "the inhabitants of such townships for the use of
schools."" 2 Early on, the Alabama courts held that under the
terms of this grant, the title was held by the state as trustee for
the township inhabitants," 3 but the school lands were not
technically state land."4 As such, the Alabama Supreme Court
held that they were subject to adverse possession under the sta-
tute of limitations applicable to actions to recover possession of
land generally." 5
In 1907, however, the Alabama Legislature adopted a new sta-
tute which provided that there was no limitation of time on the
state's ability to bring a cause of action for the recovery of state
land generally, and went on to exempt specifically "sixteenth
section lands, school indemnity lands and all other school lands,
the lands of the University of Alabama, Auburn University and
of any other public educational or governmental institution of
this state.""6 Under these new provisions, the Alabama Supreme
Court held that unless one had perfected adverse possession
against school lands before the 1907 amendments, adverse
possession could no longer be achieved." 7
Illinois, like many of the states discussed above, was granted
section sixteen lands for the use of the township schools upon
admission to the Union." 8 Supplemental legislation was passed
by the Congress twenty-four years later, permitting the state to
sell school lands and apply the proceeds to the use of schools." 9
Despite the apparent intent of the Congress that these lands be
dedicated exclusively to the support of schools, Illinois has not
acted consistently with that intent. An early case permitted the
112. Alabama Enabling Act, ch. XLVII, § 6, 3 Stat. 490, 491 (1819).
113. See Long & Long v. Brown, 4 Ala. 622, 629 (1843).
114. See State v. Schmidt, 61 So. 293, 293 (Ala.), affd, 232 U.S. 168 (1913).
115. See Grissom v. State ex rel. Alabama College, 48 So. 2d 197, 200 (Ala. 1950);
Schmidt, 61 So. at 293-94; Miller v. State, 38 Ala. 600, 604 (1863). Consider the
difference in approach by the Washington Supreme Court. In Bellevue Sch. Dist. No.
405 v. Brazier Constr. Co., 691 P.2d 178, 181 (Wash. 1984), the court exempted a school
district from the statute of limitations applicable to construction claims that would
ordinarily apply to a municipality: "It is well settled that school districts act on behalf
of the State when they build and maintain school buildings." Id. at 182. Because
'[elducation is one of the paramount duties of the state," a local school district was
entitled to the state's immunity from statutes of limitations when suing for breach of
construction contracts related to the high school. Id. (quoting Edmonds Sch. Dist. No.
15 v. City of Mountain Lake, 465 P.2d 177, 178 (Wash. 1970)).
116. ALA. CODE §§ 6-2-31,6-6-281 (1993) (originally found in ALA. CODE § 3859 (1907)).
117. See Grissom, 48 So. 2d at 200.
118. See Illinois Enabling Act, ch. LXVII, § 6, 3 Stat. 428, 430 (1818).
119. Act of Feb. 15, 1843, ch. 33, 5 Stat. 600 (1843).
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adverse possession of school lands owned by a school district.120
The court never mentioned the organic documents, the state
constitution,'12 or the congressional intent that such lands be
faithfully applied to the schools. 22 The current Illinois constitu-
tion makes no mention at all of school lands and has no re-
quirement that proceeds of such lands be applied to the use of
schools.'23 It seems that Illinois has disregarded entirely the
original congressional intent with regard to the grant of land for
the support of schools.
Illinois has a rather complex set of statutes relating to adverse
possession and school lands. One statute provides a twenty-year
limitations period for adverse possession generally. 124 Although
this section says nothing about its applicability to state-owned
land, the courts have held that it cannot be used to make an
adverse possession claim against state-owned lands. 25 Another
Illinois statute provides a seven-year statute of limitations for
adverse possession under color of title and with payment of
applicable taxes. 26 By a separate section, state-owned lands
generally, and school lands specifically, are made immune from
adverse possession under this seven-year statute of limita-
tions. 27 It is not clear why the Illinois legislature chose to leave
school lands subject to the longer twenty-year statute of limita-
tions while protecting them from the seven-year statute.
Perhaps the longer time period is deemed sufficient protection
for the school lands. Furthermore, in the section making state-
owned and school lands immune from the seven-year statute of
limitations, the Illinois legislature stated that the exemptions
in that section would not protect such lands from loss under the
state's forty-year Marketable Title Act provisions.
28
120. See Brown v. Trustees of Sch., 79 N.E. 579, 581 (Ill. 1906).
121. The Illinois Constitution of 1870 provided: "All lands, moneys, or other property,
donated, granted or received for schools, college, seminary or university purposes, and
the proceeds thereof, shall be faithfully applied to the objects for which such gifts or
grants were made." ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 8, § 2 (repealed 1970). No specific mention
was made of section 16 lands granted by the United States.
122. See Brown, 79 N.E. at 580-81.
123. See ILL. CONST. art. 10.
124. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-101 (West 1994).
125. See Black v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. Co., 86 N.E. 1065, 1067 (Ill. 1908).
126. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-109, 13-110 (West 1994).
127. See id. at 5/13-111.
128. Id. The Marketable Title Act also makes it clear that its provisions apply to
state-owned land as well as that of all political subdivisions. Id. at 5/13-12 1. Thus, in
Illinois, while state-owned land generally is protected by the courts from adverse pos-
962
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As this section has demonstrated, in spite of the similarity in
the original grants of school lands from the United States to the
states, the protection offered to such lands under state laws
varies substantially. Given the almost universal concern about
funding education, it would appear wise for those states where
school lands are not exempt from adverse possession to consider
making them so as a simple way to preserve this valuable edu-
cational asset.
2. Land Held by the State in a Proprietary Capacity is
Subject to Adverse Possession-A number of states allow adverse
possession of state-owned land held in a proprietary or non-
governmental capacity while maintaining the immunity for
state-owned land held in a governmental capacity.'29 In others,
this distinction has been expressly rejected. 3 °
session under the 20-year statute of limitations, and both state-owned and school lands
are statutorily protected from adverse possession under the seven-year statute of
limitations, both are subject to loss under the 40-year Marketable Title Act. For a
general explanation of marketable record title acts, see supra note 45.
Like Illinois, Washington has a multi-level approach to adverse possession and to the
protection of school lands. The statutes provide a 10-year statute of limitations for
adverse possession generally. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.020 (West 1986 and
Supp. 1996). While state-owned lands are expressly protected from the application of
this statute of limitations, lands of counties, municipalities and "quasimunicipalit[ies]"
are left subject to it. See id. § 4.16.160 (West 1996). Ordinarily, a school district would
appear to be a county, municipality, or quasimunicipality of the state, and thus subject
to the statute of limitations. The Washington Supreme Court, however, held that a
school district was acting on behalf of the state when it sued for breach of contract for
the construction of a high school and thus was immune from the operation of the statute
of limitations. See Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Brazier Constr. Co., 691 P.2d 178, 182
(Wash. 1984). It appears likely, based on this holding, that the Washington courts would
also give local governments the protection of the state's immunity from the statute of
limitations to protect their school lands from adverse possession.
A separate chapter of the Washington statutes provides a general seven-year statute
of limitations for adverse possession under color of title and payment of taxes. See WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 7.28.070 (West 1992). This chapter expressly exempts school lands
from its operations. See id. § 7.28.090.
129. See, e.g., Goldman v. Quadrato, 114 A.2d 687, 690 (Conn. 1955); Hall v.
Nascimento, 594 A.2d 874, 877-78 (R.I. 1991); Outlaw v. Moise, 71 S.E.2d 509, 511 (S.C.
1952). This dichotomy is similarly applied in many states to land held by municipal
governments. See, e.g., Central Collection Unit v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., 356 A.2d
555, 557 (Md. 1976) (opining that immunity "as applied to political subdivisions, is
ordinarily limited to land held in a governmental capacity").
130. See, e.g., Todd v. State, 474 So. 2d 430, 431 (La. 1985) (observing that the
.strong public policy of the state to protect the wealth of its lands and minerals would
not be served by distinguishing between public things and private things and permitting
the possessory action against the state as relates to private things"); Pioneer Nat'l Title
Ins. Co. v. State, 695 P.2d 996, 998 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that the "governmen-
tal-proprietary distinction as to the capacity in which the property is held arises only
with regard to claims against counties and municipalities" not state-owned property);
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Connecticut provides a general fifteen-year statute of limi-
tations for adverse possession, but is silent as to the treatment
of state-owned land.'3 ' In analyzing claims against state land,
the courts have frequently stated that adverse possession does
not run against the state or its subdivisions as to land held for
public use.'32 No cases appear to have held that the state's use
was not sufficiently "public." Presumably, however, a case could
arise in which state land not dedicated to a public use would be
lost through adverse possession.
New York's statute expressly provides a twenty-year statute
of limitations for adverse possession of state-owned land.' By
its terms, this statute makes no distinction between land held
in a proprietary capacity and land held for public use. The New
York courts, however, have held that this section allows adverse
possession only of lands not "held in trust for the public." 13 4 But
not all lands "held in trust" are subject to the same rule on
adverse possession. Some "trust lands" are completely inalien-
able under state constitutional provisions 35 while others are
alienable by express grant.'36 Under New York law, adverse
possession "always rests on the presumption of a lost grant."37
For this reason, the courts have held consistently that where
public trust property is inalienable under the state's constitu-
tion, no presumption of a grant can arise, and the land cannot
be adversely possessed.'38 Thus, in cases involving canal land
Simonson v. Veit, 683 P.2d 611,614 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the "statute does
not distinguish between the proprietary and the governmental functions of the state,
and no such distinction has been implied in the case law").
131. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-575 (West 1991).
132. See, e.g., American Trading Real Estate Properties, Inc. v. Town of Trumbull,
574 A.2d 796, 800 (Conn. 1990); Matto v. Dan Beard, Inc., 546 A.2d 854, 863 (Conn. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 550 A.2d 1082 (1988).
133. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 211(c) (McKinney 1990).
134. See Gottfried v. State, 201 N.YS.2d 649, 666 (Ct. Cl. 1960), modified, 218
N.Y.S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1961), affd, 184 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1962). While some New York
cases have implied that adverse possession can never succeed against the State, the
claimants in those cases did not argue that the uses in question were nonpublic. See
State v. Case, 356 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (App. Div. 1974); Romart Properties, Inc. v. City
of New Rochelle, 324 N.Y.S.2d 277, 286 (Sup. Ct. 1971), affd, 40 A.D.2d 987 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1972).
135. See, e.g., Helms v. Diamond, 349 N.Y.S.2d 917, 921-22 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Smith
v. People, 193 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129-30 (App. Div. 1959).
136. See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 283 N.Y.S.2d 615, 621 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Gottfried, 201
N.Y.S.2d at 666.
137. People v. System Properties, Inc., 141 N.E.2d 429, 434 (N.Y. 1957).
138. See City of New York v. Wilson & Co., 15 N.E.2d 408 (N.Y. 1938); Donahue v.
State, 19 N.E. 419 (N.Y. 1889).
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and forest preserve land, the claimants could not establish ad-
verse possession even though they had satisfied all of the
elements because the lands were held subject to an inalienable
public trust.39
The New York rule is different as to state-owned public trust
lands alienable by grant. A 1922 case expressly left open the
question of whether such alienable lands could be acquired by
adverse possession. 4 ° In 1957, the New York Court of Appeals
answered this question in the affirmative, holding that the state
legally could have made a grant of the bed of a navigable river,
and because of that, adverse possession of the bed was possi-
ble.' The court went on to hold that while the private claimant
might now own the bed of the river, he had no right to use the
river in a manner that would interfere with the state's ability
to control the river, navigation in general, or the level of the
lake that poured into the river. This meant that the state could
regulate the dam owned and operated by the claimant, even
though it no longer owned the land under the dam or the dam
itself. 42
Both California and Montana expressly provide that land dedi-
cated to "public use" may not be taken by adverse possession,
no matter how long the occupancy continues. 43 Montana empha-
sizes that state-owned land is not dedicated to "public use"
simply because it is owned by the state: "All property has an
owner, whether that owner is the state and the property public
or the owner an individual and the property private. The state
may also hold property as a private proprietor."
144
In one California case decided under this "public use" pro-
vision, the state had leased land to the City of San Francisco for
ninety-nine years, with the expectation "that the lots should be
filled in and utilized for the purpose of business and industry."
145
Shortly thereafter, the city sold the land to private interests who
immediately constructed buildings on it. About a year later it
139. See Smith, 193 N.YS.2d at 129-30 (involving canal land in a state-owned reser-
voir area); Helms, 349 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (involving forest preserve land).
140. See Hinkley v. State, 137 N.E. 599, 602-03 (N.Y 1922) (refraining from "holding
that in no instance can title be acquired by adverse possession where the state in the
first instance could have made a grant of the land to private individuals").
141. See System Properties, Inc., 141 N.E.2d at 434.
142. See id. at 435.
143. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-19-301 (1995).
144. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-1-102 (1995) (emphasis added).
145. Henry Cowell Lime & Cement Co. v. State, 114 P.2d 331, 332 (Cal. 1941)
(citations omitted).
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was determined that the sales were invalid, and therefore the
purchasers had not acquired a valid title. 46 In spite of this
ruling, the purchasers continued in use and possession, and
ninety years later, the California Supreme Court held that the
state had not dedicated the land for public use and that the
purchasers had adversely possessed the land.
14
West Virginia's statute provides generally that "[elvery statute
of limitation, unless otherwise expressly provided, shall apply
to the State."148 It would appear then, that the ten-year statute
of limitations for adverse possession 149 would apply to all state
land. The West Virginia courts, however, have determined that
the statute runs only against state-owned land not used for
governmental purposes.150 In reaching this conclusion, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted the state's vast
holdings of "wild lands," observing that "state officers cannot
possibly watch lands in all sections of the state."'5 ' The court
said:
[Me may well doubt the wisdom of the statute giving benefit
of limitation to the occupant in such case, and thus causing
the state to lose its property. But the Legislature has seen
proper to do so: but can we say that it intended to deprive
the state of property which in its very self is held for govern-
ment purposes, and essential to enable the public authorities
to carry on government? We cannot think so.... Reason,
necessity, the public welfare, and legal authorities deny such
result.52
Yet, given the changing nature of government uses, the
distinction between governmental and proprietary uses may no
longer be valid in many jurisdictions. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court presciently noted more than twenty years ago that
what constitutes a "public use" may be expected to change over
time as governmental functions change.153 Legislatures are in-
creasingly cognizant that holding land in its open, natural
146. See id.
147. See id. at 333.
148. W. VA. CODE § 55-2-19 (1994).
149. See id. § 55-2-1.
150. See State v. Harman, 50 S.E. 828, 837 (W. Va. 1905); Foley v. Doddridge County
Ct., 46 S.E. 246, 251 (W. Va. 1903).
151. Foley, 46 S.E. at 251.
152. Id.
153. See Torch v. Constantino, 323 A.2d 278, 280 (Pa. 1974).
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condition may achieve a valuable public goal. The Massachusetts
legislature, for instance, recently amended its adverse posses-
sion statute to protect "land or interests in land held for conser-
vation, open space, parks, recreation, water protection, wildlife
protection or other public purpose."" 4 It would seem that in a
world where undeveloped land is becoming increasingly scarce,
all state-owned land, even that held without development plans,
should be considered held for public use and immune from ad-
verse possession..
D. In Some States, Estoppel Can Result
in Loss of State Land
In a number of states, courts have held that under appropriate
circumstances, the state may be estopped from recovering land
from private users regardless of whether adverse possession is
available against state land. For example, in a now-repealed
statute, Florida had made itself immune to the seven-year
statute of limitations applicable to the recovery of land.155 The
Florida courts held however, that individuals could obtain title
to state land through estoppel, regardless of any adverse posses-
sion claims.'56 Likewise, in a recent case, the Washington Court
of Appeals also held that estoppel claims can be made against
the state.
157
154. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
155. See FLA. STAT. ch. 19.15 (1973) (repealed 1974).
156. See, e.g., Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1950) (en banc). In Daniell, land
owned by the United States was sold erroneously at a tax sale in which the State of
Florida issued tax deeds as grantor. Thereafter, state and local taxes were assessed and
paid. In 1947, the U.S. government sold the property to the State of Florida. The State
then sought to quiet title in itself as against the individuals who had been occupying
the land and paying state taxes on it for more than 50 years. See id. at 737-38. The
Florida Supreme Court held that the State was estopped from denying its own deeds
based on general principles governing conveyancing as well as its own conduct, including
its acquiescence in possession for more than 50 years, the collection of taxes, and the
failure to offer to refund those taxes. See id. at 740; see also Lobean v. Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Fund, 118 So. 2d 226 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960). In Lobean, the State
mistakenly had sold submerged lands to the plaintiff. Such lands are sovereignty lands
that cannot be sold in the manner used by the State, and the deed was unquestionably
void. Nonetheless, the Florida Supreme Court held that the State was legally estopped
to deny its own deed. Id. at 227-30. The court reached the same conclusion on similar
facts in Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund v. Bass, 67 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1953).
157. See Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. State, 695 P.2d 996, 997 (Wash. Ct. App.
1985). The State apparently had not known that a county had mistakenly sold state-
owned school lands at a tax sale. When the mistake was discovered several years later,
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In a contrary vein, the New York courts decided early on that
estoppel is not available against the state. Thus, even where a
private claimant had been assessed and had paid state taxes
from 1857 to 1921, the state was "not prejudiced in its rights by
the failure of its appointed agents or officers to obey its com-
mands, nor by their unauthorized acts or omissions."58
Given the importance of the state's interest in protecting title
to its land, and the corresponding significance to an individual
who has been led to believe in good faith that he has acquired
valid title based on the actions of state employees, it would seem
that the Washington Court of Appeals has struck the proper
balance. That court said:
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable against a
state acting in its governmental as well as proprietary capa-
city when necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, and the
exercise of governmental powers will not thereby be im-
paired. The doctrine is not favored, however, and requires
that every particular be proved with clear, cogent and con-
vincing evidence.'59
In applying this rule, it would be reasonable and appropriate
to favor a party who not only has paid adequate consideration
for a deed but also has relied in good faith on state officers in
accepting a deed. 60 To permit the state in this setting to retract
its deed could, it seems, often cause manifest injustice. It will
be a rare case where the state's exercise of governmental powers
will be impaired by holding it to its sale. It is likely that this
will occur only where unusual public trust land is at stake.
Absent payment and a deed, however, it should be very difficult
for a private claimant to succeed on an estoppel claim against
a state. This should be especially true for those states that do
not permit adverse possession of state land.
the State immediately notified the current possessors of its interest. The Washington
Court of Appeals refused to find estoppel against the State, but only because the proper
conditions had not been met, not because such claims cannot be made. Id. at 997-98.
158. See People v. Baldwin, 188 N.Y.S. 542, 545-46 (N.Y App. Div. 1921), affd, 135
N.E. 964 (N.Y. 1922).
159. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 695 P.2d at 997 (citations omitted).
160. This was the setting in the Florida and Washington cases, discussed supra notes
156-57 and accompanying text.
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E. Some State Courts Ignore State Laws Regulating
Adverse Possession of State Lands
It seems that the hornbook law that state land is not subject
to adverse possession is so well known that a number of attor-
neys and judges have forgotten the follow-up provision. That is,
the state is not subject to adverse possession unless it has
agreed to be. In a number of cases, the parties and the courts
seem not to have realized that their state had legislatively
agreed to be bound by the applicable statute of limitations for
purposes of adverse possession. In other states, courts failed to
notice that their legislatures had provided expressly that the
state was not subject to limitations periods and adverse posses-
sion.
For example, Michigan law expressly allowed adverse pos-
session against state land as early as 1846."6 This provision was
reenacted consistently each time the state revised its limitations
provisions. The attorneys and courts of Michigan invoked the
statute sparingly. In a series of cases between 1911 and 1976,
the Michigan Supreme Court repeatedly held that the statute
of limitations did not run against the state.'62 Years later, the
Michigan Court of Appeals speculated that the statute "appears
to have been ignored by bench and bar."'63
In 1976, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals discovered
the long-standing statute and gave it effect. The court held that
the state had lost the land at issue in the case by adverse pos-
session.6 Despite this unambiguous application of the statute
161. See MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 139, § 11 (Green 1846).
162. See Young v. Thendara, Inc., 43 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 1950); Grand Rapids Trust
Co. v. Doctor, 192 N.W. 641 (Mich. 1923); Merritt v. Westerman, 131 N.W. 66 (Mich.
1911).
163. Caywood v. Department of Natural Resources, 248 N.W.2d 253, 258 (Mich.
1976).
164. Id. at 258. The Caywood court struggled with the apparent conflict between the
clear language of the statute and contrary case law:
We have expressed statutory language which appears to allow adverse possession
claims against the state. On the other hand, we have Supreme Court precedent
which apparently demands the contrary result. Our inclination would be to assume
that the Court had not been called upon to decide the meaning of the statute and
that we would be free to find the meaning of this legislation.
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in 1976, the state continued to argue that it should not be
subject to adverse possession.'65 In 1984, the Michigan Court of
Appeals put that argument to rest, again allowing a private
claimant to take state land by adverse possession. 6 ' This case
may have been the genesis for the Michigan legislature's change
to the law in 1988, making state land immune from adverse
possession.
117
Similarly, New Jersey law provides that no person "shall be
sued or impleaded by the state of New Jersey for any real es-
tate, or for any rents ... except within 20 years next after the
right or title thereto or cause of such action shall have ac-
crued."' Nonetheless, a New Jersey court has held that
"[a]dverse possession does not run against the State;.there can
be no title by prescription against the public." 69 In a case invol-
ving an attempt to acquire adverse title to property owned by
a municipality, Devins v. Borough of Bogota,7 ° the New Jersey
Supreme Court examined the history of adverse possession
against governmental entities in general.' 7' The court noted the
twenty-year statute of limitations that expressly applies to the
state, but then argued:
Although none of the New Jersey statutes of limitation ex-
pressly excepts governmental entities, courts have long
ruled, in reliance on the principle of nullum tempus, that the
statutes do not run against property owned by either the
State or by a municipality. These decisions, however, have
all involved land dedicated to or used for a public purpose.'72
Perhaps trying to explain this inconsistency between the legis-
lation and the court decisions, the court said, "Historically,
165. See Mackinac Island Dev. Co. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co., 349 N.W.2d 191,
197 (Mich. 1984).
166. See id. at 198.
167. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5821 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996). Subsequent
to this amendment, the Michigan Court of Appeals enforced a claim for adverse pos-
session of state land. See Gorte v. Department of Transp., 507 N.W.2d 797, 801 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a private claimant could claim adverse possession of state
land where the statute of limitations had passed before the enactment of the amend-
ment, even though his action was not filed until after its passage).
168. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-8 (West 1987).
169. State v. Maas & Waldstein Co., 199 A.2d 248, 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1964).
170. 592 A.2d 199 (N.J. 1991).
171. See id. at 201.
172. Id. at 201-02 (citations omitted).
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courts have been more exacting when reviewing claims of ad-
verse possession of governmentally-owned property. So stringent
are the requirements that neither our research nor that of coun-
sel has uncovered a New Jersey case allowing a claim of adverse
possession of governmental property."
173
Perhaps the New Jersey court was trying to say that the state
has retained its immunity from adverse possession as it applies
to land held for a public or governmental purpose, despite the
broad language of the statute to the contrary. If that was the
message, however, it was not based on anything found in the
statute, or in the older cases, none of which made a distinction
as to the use to which the land was put. Surely a subject as
important as this to the state and to private claimants should
be more clearly explained. In concluding its opinion, the Devins
court said:
Given the legislative origins of statutes of limitation, includ-
ing those underlying the doctrine of adverse possession, we
anticipate that the Legislature might want to review those
statutes in light of today's decision. In inviting the Legisla-
ture's attention, we note that other states have looked to
their legislatures for the abolition of nullum tempus. We
therefore commend the matter to the Legislature.
174
Given the straightforward language of the existing statute, it
is not clear what more the Devins court wanted. Despite the
Devins court's invitation to the New Jersey legislature, the law
has not been changed. Indeed, legislation has been introduced
that would reverse the Devins decision and specifically protect
state and municipally owned land from adverse possession.
175
Although a statute in Delaware"' expressly exempts the state
from adverse possession, the Delaware courts have discussed the
issue solely in terms of the common law. In Kemper v. Aetna
Hose, Hook & Ladder Co.,' vv the Delaware Court of Chancery
concluded that the state was immune from adverse possession
under the general theory that "acts of limitation do not run
against the state, unless a statute provides otherwise,"7 8 but
173. Id. at 201.
174. Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
175. N.J.A.B. 95, 207th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 1996).
176. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 4519 (1974 & Supp. 1994).
177. 394 A.2d 238 (Del. Ch. 1978).
178. Id. at 239.
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made no reference to the express immunity provided by statute.
The court did note that a former statute permitting adverse
possession against the state had been repealed in 1953179 but did
not acknowledge the more recent statute'80 codifying the state's
immunity.
On its face, Minnesota's statute would seem to protect only
state-owned land dedicated to public use from adverse posses-
sion. The statute says that the state and its subdivisions are
generally subject to all statutory limitations periods, but then
limits that by providing that "no occupant of a public way, levee,
square, or other ground dedicated or appropriated to public use
shall acquire, by reason of occupancy, any title thereto."'
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has refused to give
state-owned land such limited protection. In reading this statu-
tory language, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a claim
that land not previously dedicated to public use was subject to
adverse possession.8 2 Instead, it examined a long line of cases
holding state-owned land immune. 8 3 Because of these cases, and
in spite of the limiting language of the statute, the court con-
cluded: "Simply put, the rule is that one cannot acquire adverse
title against the sovereign under our statutory scheme.""4
It seems clear beyond cavil that a review of the statutory law
is in order for the parties and courts in many states. Where the
common law rule of immunity is so ingrained that parties and
courts do not even bother to check for statutes abrogating or
confirming that immunity, it is easy for mistakes to occur. In
states like New Jersey, where the courts have refused to allow
adverse possession of state land, the legislation should be
amended to achieve that same result.
F. The State Is Made Statutorily Immune
From All Adverse Possession
A number of states have enacted legislation that expressly
provides that statutes of limitations do not apply to actions by
179. See id. at 240 (citation omitted).
180. See title 7, § 4519.
181. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.01 (West 1988).
182. See Fischer v. City of Sauk Rapids, 325 N.W.2d 816, 819 (Minn. 1982).
183. See id. at 818-19.
184. Id. at 819.
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the state to recover land. They have done so in a variety of
ways. Most of these states have provided, more or less simply,
that adverse possession is not available against the state.
185
Other states have chosen not to make a simple statement of
government immunity from adverse possession. Instead, they
exempt the state from the operation of the statutes of limita-
tions by reference to other specified sections.'86
Some legislation does not discuss a statute of limitations re-
lating to land specifically, but makes the state immune from all
statutes of limitations."' Yet other states take quite a different
approach. Rather than exempting the state from all limitations
periods, the state is generally made subject to all statutes of
limitations. These states then except those statutes involving
the recovery or possession of land. For example, Nevada's sta-
tute makes it clear that although adverse possession statutes
of limitations do not run against the state, all other limitations
periods do.'88
Washington makes a distinction in its statute between the dif-
ferent levels of government, limiting actions by counties, munici-
palities and quasimunicipalities, but exempting actions brought
by the state.
189
Finally, Wyoming is unusual in that it does not specifically
exempt the state from the running of the statutes of limita-
tions. 9 ° Wyoming does, however, spell out a process for the sale
of state lands' 91 that requires that such lands be sold "only at
public auction to the highest responsible bidder after having
been duly appraised by the board [of land commissioners] ...
and for not less than ten dollars. . . per acre."' 92 Concomitantly,
a "fee interest in any state land may be perfected only as herein
provided and only by express grant by the state of Wyoming for
185. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 38.95.010 (Michie 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-41-
101 (West 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 4519 (1974 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-
406, -407 (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-20-2 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-509
(1994); MICH. COMP. LAws. ANN. § 27A.5821 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 516.090 (West 1952); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 539:6 (1974).
186. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-2-31(1975); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.061
(West 1986).
187. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-51 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.250 (1995).
188. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.255 (Michie 1986).
189. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.160 (West 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.090
(West 1992).
190. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-103 (Michie 1996).
191. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-9-101 to -114 (Michie 1977).
192. Id. § 36-9-102.
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that purpose."'93 If a fee interest in state land may be perfected
only by express grant after auction to the highest bidder, it
would seem clear that adverse possession statutes of limitations
do not run against state-owned land.
G. Some Special Types of State-Owned Land Are
Expressly Protected from Adverse Possession
In a number of states, special statutes of limitations protect
specific open state lands from adverse possession or prescription.
Often these lands fall within the jurisdiction of a specific en-
vironmental or forestry department.
For example, Kentucky expressly makes the state subject to
the limitations periods prescribed for private persons. 194 None-
theless, a separate chapter establishing the Division of Forestry
provides that land owned by the Division may not be taken by
adverse possession.'95
Similarly, in Massachusetts, the state is generally subject to
a twenty-year statute of limitations. 96 A separate section, how-
ever, provides that no person shall acquire any rights by pre-
scription or adverse possession in lands under the control of the
Department of Environmental Management.
197
The State of Washington is in general immune from all
adverse possession,'98 but the Washington legislature has pro-
vided specifically that no rights in surface or ground waters of
the state may be acquired by adverse possession or by pre-
scription.
99
If all state-owned land were clearly immune from adverse
possession, there would be no need for this piecemeal approach.
These statutes reflect a concern that open and undeveloped
lands not be lost to occupying claimants. °0 Such concerns appear
equally valid as to open land generally owned by the state.
193. Id. § 36-9-112(a).
194. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 413.150 (Michie 1992).
195. See id. § 149.040(3).
196. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
197. See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 132, § 36A (Law. Co-op. 1989).
198. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.160 (West 1988).
199. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.14.220 (West 1992).
200. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In the last twenty years, several states have made legislative
changes to their laws that address adverse possession of state-
owned land.2 ' In four states, the legislatures have moved to pro-
vide greater protection for state-owned land.2"2 In one state,
however, state-owned land became subject to adverse possession
after a long period of immunity."' It thus appears that the trend
in these states has been in favor of providing more protection
of state-owned land than has heretofore existed.
These developments make sense for a number of reasons.
First, as state resources become increasingly scarce, protecting
state land from adverse possession by law is a relatively easy
and inexpensive way to ensure that the state retains the land
it has. It is quite clear that in a time of declining budgets, the
states will have fewer dollars for monitoring their land and for
bringing ejectment actions to clear them.
Preventing adverse possession of state land also avoids con-
frontation with trespassers. The state is not forced to oust
trespassers to protect its interest and thus can avoid the risks
involved in ejectment actions.0 4
A few states have moved to protect open lands from adverse
possession.20 5 This legislative protection reflects the recognition
that there is a value in keeping lands open and undeveloped.
Such lands historically could have been subject to adverse
possession in those states protecting only lands held in a govern-
mental capacity. The holding of open and undeveloped land
traditionally would not have been deemed to constitute a govern-
mental or "public purpose." Rather than relying on courts to
continue expanding the definition of what constitutes a public
201. See infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
202. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-20-2 (West Supp. 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260,
§ 31 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5821 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (Supp. 1995).
203. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 95.011 (Harrison 1996).
204. The misadventures of federal agents in the western states trying to protect
federal lands is one example of this type of problem. See Tom Kenworthy, Western
Interests Lose Court Battle Over Public Lands, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1996, at A27; End
Western 'Range War,' Make Wise Use of Land, USA TODAY, Mar. 14, 1996, at A10.
205. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 149.040 (Michie 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7,
§ 40E (Law. Co-op. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 7.28.090 (West 1992).
SUMMER 1996]
976 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:4
or governmental purpose,20 6 however, these legislatures have
acted correctly to make it clear that the states have an interest
in seeing that open lands remain state land.
Developments in land use regulation law have tended to limit
the types of development restrictions state and local govern-
ments can place on private landowners. 20 ' Because states are ex-
periencing a decreased ability to prevent development of private
land, it will become all the more important that undeveloped
state land remain that way. Preventing adverse possession of
all state land is one simple way to ensure that the states will
not lose the ability to protect open lands despite reduced en-
forcement budgets.
The only state to completely abrogate its immunity in recent
years is Florida,20 8 but Wisconsin has also moved to make it
easier to obtain adverse possession of state-owned land in one
significant respect. In 1979, the Wisconsin legislature cut in half
the time in which adverse possession of state-owned land could
be achieved.20 9
Given the limited ability of states to prevent the development
of privately owned lands,210 and the pressures to develop
206. The Pennsylvania courts have long noted that the definition of what constitutes
a governmental purpose will change over time:
[Vliews as to what constitutes a public use necessarily vary with changing
conceptions of the scope and functions of government, so that today there are
familiar examples of such use which formerly would not have been so considered.
As governmental activities increase with the growing complexity and integration
of society, the concept of 'public use' naturally expands in proportion.
Torch v. Constantino, 323 A.2d 278, 280 (Pa. 1974) (citation omitted).
207. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992)
(holding that government regulations governing land development that reduce the value
of a parcel to zero constitute a taking unless the proposed development could have been
prohibited at common law); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319-20 (1994)
(holding that a development permit condition must have a nexus to a legitimate state
interest and that the condition must bear a "rough proportionality" to the expected
impact of the proposed development).
208. In 1978, the legislature enacted a provision protecting state-owned lands from
the application of the statutes of limitations, but provided that this subsection would
expire on July 1, 1983. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-289. This section was not renewed after
its expiration in July 1, 1983. In 1985, the language was deleted from the statute. 1985
Fla. Laws ch. 85-80. It would appear then, that Florida's state-owned land is treated
exactly the same as privately owned land for purposes of the seven-year adverse pos-
session statute of limitations. See FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 95.12 (Harrison 1996).
209. See WIS. STAT. § 893.29 (1991-92). This new legislation provides a twenty-year
statute of limitations, while specifying a number of types of state-owned land that are
completely exempt from adverse possession. See id.
210. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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undeveloped areas, it is disappointing to see states making their
own limited resources more readily susceptible to adverse
possession. In contrast, it makes sense that the legislatures in
at least four other states have voted to increase the protection
afforded to their state-owned lands.
Indiana and Michigan have gone the farthest in protecting
state-owned land from private claimants. In both states, the
legislatures have adopted language providing complete immu-
nity from adverse possession.
Since at least 1931, Indiana law had expressly allowed ad-
verse possession of state-owned land with a twenty-year statute
of limitations.21' This rule was abolished in favor of complete
immunity for state-owned land in 1985 by statutory language
that reads simply: "Title to real property owned by the state
may not be alienated by adverse possession."212
Michigan's statutory turn-around on this issue was equally
dramatic. Since at least 1846, state law had expressly permitted
adverse possession of state-owned land.213 In 1988, however, the
Michigan legislature reversed course, adopting language stating:
"Actions for the recovery of any land where the state is a party
are not subject to the periods of limitations, or laches."21' Quite
recently, the Michigan Court of Appeals commented on this
change, saying, "we note the Legislature has decided that a
claim of adverse possession against state lands is against public
policy and, therefore, will not be recognized."215
Other states have also moved to reduce the exposure of state-
owned land to adverse possession, but have not made such land
completely immune. For example, North Carolina has histori-
cally provided that the limitations generally applicable to civil
actions apply equally to actions brought in the name of the
state.21 6 In 1985, however, the North Carolina legislature adopt-
ed a provision protecting from adverse possession "real property
held by the State and subject to public trust rights."21 ' This
211. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-19-1 (West 1979) (repealed 1985).
212. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-20-2 (West Supp. 1996).
213. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5821 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996).
214. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.5821 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996). This action
followed two decisions by the Michigan Court of Appeals that had permitted adverse
possession of state land. See Caywood v. Department of Natural Resources, 248 N.W.2d
253, 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Mackinac Island Dev. Co. v. Burton Abstract & Title Co.,
349 N.W.2d 191, 197 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
215. Goodall v. Whitefish Hunting Club, 528 N.W2d 221,224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
216. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-30, 1-35(1), 1-35(2) (1983).
217. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (Supp. 1995).
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provision defined "public trust rights" as "those rights held in
trust by the State for the use and benefit of the people of the
State in common."218
Massachusetts has also long permitted adverse possession of
state-owned land. Historically, the only state-owned land not
subject to adverse possession included province land in Province-
town, the "Back Bay" lands of Boston, and land below the high
water mark or in the "great ponds."21 9 In 1987, the Massachu-
setts legislature expanded this protection to include "land or
interests in land held for conservation, open space, parks,
recreation, water protection, wildlife protection or other public
purpose."22' Although this will leave land held by the state in
a proprietary capacity subject to adverse possession, it should
remove the lion's share of state-owned land from the reach of
private claimants.
CONCLUSION
It is open to some debate whether it was ever appropriate for
state-owned land to be subject to adverse possession by private
interests. Prevention of stale claims and achieving certainty of
title simply does not justify the loss of state lands. Historically,
most states recognized this and chose to make their lands
immune from adverse possession. In those states where state-
owned land continues to be subject to adverse possession, one
may well suggest that it is time to revisit this issue. Between
development pressures on ever-shrinking open lands, reduced
state-land protection enforcement budgets, and the pressures on
the ecosystem to handle ever greater pressures of development,
a simple solution is to make state-owned land expressly immune
from all forms of adverse possession. In this way, state resources
used for monitoring and challenging encroachments can be used
elsewhere, without the fear that the state's title will be lost to
aggressive developers. Further, states will be freed of the need
218. Id. More specifically, public trust rights "include, but are not limited to, the
right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational activities in the water-
courses of the State and the right to freely use and enjoy the State's ocean and estuarine
beaches and public access to the beaches." Id.
219. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 260, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1992).
220. Id.
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to prove that keeping undeveloped lands undeveloped qualifies
as holding them for a governmental or public purpose.
The hornbook rule, in its broadest application-that state
land is immune from adverse possession-is a good one. States
should be protected from the loss of state lands because of the
laziness, mistake, or dishonesty of their employees. Given the
uncertainty of the courts and parties as to what the law is on
this issue in certain states, it is reasonable to ask that legisla-
tures at least consider the posture of their law and whether it
is justified under modern conditions. States that currently
permit adverse possession should reconsider their policy in
light of current land usage and needs as well as the reliability
of enforcement measures.

